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Abstract
Increasingly software can be considered to be critical,
due to the business or other functionality which it supports.
Upgrades or changes to such software are expensive and
risky, primarily because the software has not been designed
and built for ease of change. Expertise, tools and method-
ologies which support the design and implementation of
software systems that evolve without risk (of failure or loss
of quality) are essential. We address a research agenda
for building software in computer-based systems that (a) is
highly reliable and (b) retains this reliability as it evolves,
either over time or at run-time.
1 Introduction
There are few areas of modern life in which software is
not an important (though often invisible) component. The
software in our lives is increasingly complex; its interaction
with the real world means that its requirements are in a state
of constant change [6]. Many complex systems, from med-
ical systems to transport and telecommunication control in-
frastructures, depend on reliable, high-quality software.
The software in computer-based systems frequently need
to be modified in response to changes in system require-
ments and in their operational environment. Such modifica-
tion may involve the addition of new functionality, the ad-
justment of existing functions, or the wholesale replacement
of entire sub-systems. All such change is fraught with un-
certainty — software projects involving change frequently
fail to meet requirements, run over time and budget, or are
abandoned [10]. As the amount and complexity of software
increases, a requirement has emerged for critical software,
which can evolve without loss of quality — which is engi-
neered from the start to be easily changed, extended and re-
configured, while retaining its security, its performance, its
reliability and predictability, and the prior effort that went
into these.
With enough effort and expertise it should be possible
to evolve any large software system without loss of quality
or risk of failure. In order to keep costs reasonable a cer-
tain amount of risk might be tolerated, but if the system is
critical, and faults cannot be tolerated, the cost of evolution
will be high given today’s resources. In pathological cases,
where the cost of an evolution exceeds the business value of
the system by orders of magnitude, it would be unwise to
attempt change at all.
The need is becoming evident for a research community
that focuses on developing and refining a body of scientific
knowledge that supports the development and maintenance
of Evolving Critical Systems (ECS). This community must
concentrate its efforts on the development and refinement of
the necessary techniques, methodologies and tools to sup-
port the design, implementation, and maintenance of critical
software systems that evolve without risk (of failure or loss
of quality). We define ECS more clearly, we outline a re-
search agenda, describe a set of application scenarios, and
describe the Plan-Evolve-Assess (PEA+T) cycle for ECS,
aligning with a taxonomy of research themes for ECS.
2 Evolving Critical Systems
In order to understand the challenges of ECS it is impor-
tant to investigate the terms Evolving Systems and Critical
Systems:
Evolving (software) Systems may
• have evolved from legacy code and legacy systems;
• result from a combination of existing component-
based systems, possibly over significant periods of
time;
• require the extension of an existing system to include
new functional requirements;
• evolve as a result of a focused and intentional change
in organization and architecture to exploit newer tech-
niques believed to be beneficial, e.g., service-oriented
architectures as a means of restructuring for reuse,
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efficiency and flexibility, and a move towards multi-
core-based implementations that successfully exploit
the processing power of such an architecture;
• require that the system adapt and evolve at run-time in
order to react to changes in the environment or to meet
necessary constraints on the system that were not pre-
viously satisfied and possibly not previously known,
and which may not be achievable without a complete
“re-think” of the use of technology.
Table 1. Cost of one hour of downtime from
1996/2000[3]. Costs are likely to be signifi-
cantly higher today.
Companies cost per hour
Brokerage Operations $6,450,000
Credit Card Authorisation $2,600,000
eBay $225,000
Amazon $180,000
Package Shipping Services $150,000
Home Shopping Channel $113,000
Catalog Sales Center $90,000
The second key characteristic of the ECS research fo-
cus is the critical nature of the systems under investigation.
Critical systems are systems where failure or malfunction
will lead to significant negative consequences. These sys-
tems may have strict requirements for security and safety, to
protect the user or others. Alternatively, these systems may
be critical to the organization’s mission, product base, prof-
itability or competitive advantage. For example, an online
retailer may be able to tolerate the unavailability of their
warehousing system for several hours in a day, since most
customers will still receive their orders when promised.
However, unavailability of the website and ordering system
for several hours may result in the permanent loss of busi-
ness to a competitor (Amazon’s estimated downtime costs
were $180,000 per hour in 2000, cf. Table 1). A brief cat-
egorisation of types of critical systems is shown in Table
2.
3 An ECS Research Agenda
An ECS Research Agenda addresses several core re-
search topics in the evolving critical systems field. The cen-
tral research topic is designing, implementing, and main-
taining critical software systems that
a) are highly reliable, and
b) retain this reliability as they evolve without incurring
prohibitive costs.
Table 2. Types of Critical Systems: Many sys-
tems have overlapping aspects of criticality;
e.g., a system might be both safety-critical
and business-critical.
Type of Critical Implication for Failure
Safety-Critical May lead to loss of life, serious per-
sonal injury, or damage to the natu-
ral environment.
Mission-Critical May lead to an inability to complete
the overall system or project objec-
tives; e.g., loss of critical infrastruc-
ture or data.
Business-Critical May lead to significant tangible or
intangible economic costs; e.g., loss
of business or damage to reputation.
Security-Critical May lead to loss of sensitive data
through theft or accidental loss.
An ECS must be described in a manner that enables the
developer to understand the necessary functionality of the
system and which is expressed in a clear and precise way
and yet which offers sufficient flexibility to follow the pro-
cesses and practices within the organisation or necessitated
by the development process. While the need for complete
understanding and appropriate processes is in theory true of
all computer-based systems, it is particularly great in sys-
tems that must evolve, since we must understand the im-
plications of change for other parts of the system and the
negative effects that can ensue.
An ECS must be structured in a way that change can be
controlled and clear, with fixed core functionality and then
features that may be changed, adapt, and even be deleted in
order to support the necessary evolution. The architecture
of the system must be well understood; it may be the basis
for future decisions on changes to be made as part of the
evolution process, particularly where the system evolves at
run-time.
Criticality is an important component of ECS. As soft-
ware evolves in terms of functionality, it often degrades in
terms of reliability. While it is normal to experience failures
after deployment and the goal of much of software main-
tenance is to remove these failures, experience has shown
that evolution for new functionality and evolution for main-
tenance can both result in “spikes” of failure (cf. Figure 1).
Over time, a traditional system degrades as it evolves and
more, rather than fewer, failures are experienced [5, 10].
Determining that quality and reliability are not impaired in-
volves continual overview of the development and evolu-
tionary process, ensuring that policies and constraints are
met, collecting and recording data and evidence and com-
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putation of a range of reliability measures at various points
in time and the appropriate analysis thereof.
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Figure 2: Idealized Software Failure Curve 
Software, on the other hand, is not susceptible to the environmental factors that affect 
hardware. Hence, in theory the failure curve for software should look something as 
shown in Figure 2. Defects such as incorrect logic that are not discovered will lead to 
high failure rates early in the life of software. However, in the ideal world these will 
be discovered and fixed, which leads to the flattening of the failure curve for software 
[13]
.  
In the real world, software will undergo maintenance (change) which will lead to new 
defects being introduced, causing the failure rate to increase (spike), not decrease, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pressman [13], Figure 1.3 
Figure 3: Actual Software Failure Curve 
In order for the curve to return to the original steady-state idealized curve, more 
changes are requested, causing the curve to increase and spike again. This leads to an 
increase in the minimum failure rate, which depicts the deterioration of the software 
due to change 
[13]
. This is a highly simplified model of software failures, but it does 
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Figure 1. As complex software evolves new
e ects are int oduced, causing the failure
rate to spike and increas over time (from
[9]).
A research agenda and research community for ECS
must be concerned with the creation of the knowledge, the
processes, the protocols, and the tools that support the de-
velopment of critical systems that evolve in a way that is
cost-effective, well managed, timely, and ensures that pre-
vious levels of quality and reliability are maintained, or in
some cases (particularly in the case of adaptive systems)
even improved.
4 ECS Scenarios
ECS is important for all application domains, but most
of all where large and important computer-based systems
persist over a period of years, and must be upgraded or en-
hanced without being rewritten from scratch; or must con-
tinue to operate as specified in changing environmental con-
ditions. Important application domains include medical de-
vices, financial services, and telecommunications. Such do-
mains require reliable, flexible software of the highest stan-
dard, capable of being changed without having to go back
to the drawing board for each new version or iteration. We
have chosen ECS scenarios from four different domains of
application and outlined them here to highlight its impor-
tance.
4.1 Parallel and Multicore Computing
Many developers are faced with the opportunity of in-
creased processing power brought about by the advent of
multicore computing. However, quite often, software based
on serial execution is ported as-is to the multicore environ-
ment. It may indeed run more quickly than on a single pro-
cessor, but it fails to exploit more than a fraction of the po-
tential power [12]. Writing directly for multicore or trying
to port serial execution software to multicore is difficult;
one of the reasons for this is because the parallel environ-
ment is susceptible to subtle variations in processor speed,
load balancing, memory latency, the sequence and timing
of external interrupts and communications topology. Ide-
ally software should be evolved (automatically if possible)
to best utilise the currently available resources. Could crit-
ical software be designed to evolve itself in reaction to the
dynamic availability of computing resources? How might
an ECS be refactored according to different levels of paral-
lelisation? How might security and reliability be guaranteed
in the presence of automatically generated code? How can
we evolve existing software to exploit multicore and par-
allel architectures fully? What verification and validation
approaches are necessary for ECS in parallel computing?
4.2 Critical Network Protection
Networks can describe many important technological in-
frastructures, including the Internet, national or interna-
tional power grids, peer-to-peer systems, wireless sensor
and delay-tolerant networks. Our online infrastructures
have been found to be very lacking in security and it is be-
lieved that a number of compromises to their security have
been made by criminal, mercenary, and state-sponsored
hackers in recent years [7]. Network dynamics can allow
a local failure/threat to quickly develop into a global failure
(e.g., large scale black-outs or e-mail virus outbreaks). Can
we ensure the safety of a networked infrastructure, while
maintaining the integrity of data and ensuring responsive-
ness and availability even in the presence of malicious on-
slaughts from unknown (possibly automated) sources? How
can essential upgrades be made to these infrastructures in
such a way that security loopholes are fixed and upgrades
made without taking systems out of operation for any pe-
riod of time (even a second)? What are the critical threats
of software based on large networks? How might an ECS
predict and prevent the onset of a possible global failure?
How can the software evolve without entering into a poten-
tially unstable behaviour?
4.3 Environmental Monitoring
Performing environmental monitoring using swarms of
autonomous mobile agents is attractive when it is too dan-
gerous or expensive to send humans to do the task. The
swarm can be left in place over long periods of time, dur-
ing which the mission might be expected to change. It
will not always be appropriate or possible for a human to
be in the evolution cycle — the system’s environment can
change quickly leading to new requirements for the soft-
ware. The classic example of spacecraft operating far from
earth is most obvious [13], but more mundane examples
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abound, where the software may be too complex or change
too urgent to wait for a team of humans to undertake the
required evolution. In this case, software that is capable of
identifying required changes and (at least partially) evolv-
ing itself would become more valuable. This combination
of evolutionary stimuli raises difficult problems for ECS.
How might a software system evolve the mission goals in
response to changing environmental conditions? How can
new mission requirements be incorporated into individual
agents’ current goals when the complete picture of the envi-
ronment is distributed across the swarm? How might agent
redundancy and significant communication interruptions af-
fect the risk, timeliness, and correctness of evolution?
4.4 Automotive Software
Automotive manufacturers and software vendors face a
number of problems when developing and evolving critical
systems, which include:
• high demand for customization, driven by market com-
petition and end-user preferences;
• subsystems, supplied by multiple vendors that are de-
veloped using different processes and different engi-
neering technologies;
• software applications running on these individual sub-
systems that are inherently incompatible, due to the di-
versity of vendors’ development cultures, and
• unreliability of these software applications, due to the
high pressure on vendors for fast time-to-market deliv-
ery, in turn resulting in high costs incurred by manu-
facturers for vehicle recalls and maintenance.
The current state of practice in developing embedded-
infrastructure software uses component-based architectures
such as the AUTOSAR initiative, along with static code
analysis tools to capture design flaws. However, these still
fail to address the dynamic and realtime aspects of the
infrastructure software. Advances in model-based design
technology indicate that embedded software developers can
expect more tool support for the whole electronic control
unit software spectrum [11].
From the perspective of ECS, how can we enable up-
grades to automotive software without the need to return to
a dealership? Could updates to software be made when a
driver passes a tollbooth? Could that update be installed,
safely, while the car is in motion? Can we offer services
and possible upgrades to drivers as an option that can be ac-
cepted as they pass certain points? Can we undertake these
tasks without making any safety/reliability sacrifices?
5 PEA+T
In order to arrange the core research topics under ECS
we divide them among three stages that make up a cycle for
evolving critical systems: Plan, Evolve, and Assess (PEA)
— shown in Figure 2. Tooling cross-cuts the PEA cycle and
refers to tool support for ECS:
• Plan: All activities/considerations that can occur be-
fore the system is next changed, including deciding
on the processes to use, requirements engineering, and
risk management.
• Evolve: All activities/considerations that can occur as
the system is changing, including impact analysis and
reengineering.
• Assess: All activities/considerations that can occur
after the most recent change has been made to the
system, including incremental verification and valida-
tion, and ensuring software quality attributes are main-
tained.
• Tooling: Consideration of tools to assist in the evolu-
tion cycle. Many of these support the whole cycle, e.g.,
visualisation, version control, others support particular
aspects, e.g., refactoring tools and traceability model
databases.
Plan
Evolve
Assess
Tooling
Figure 2. The PEA Cycle for Evolving Critical
Systems
The Plan-Evolve-Assess (PEA) cycle can refer to a
whole system evolution process or just a single change
made as part of a larger evolution process. The PEA cycle
has much in common with IBM’s Monitor, Analyze, Plan,
Execute (MAPE) model for Autonomic Computing [4], and
Dobson et al.’s Autonomics Feedback Loop [1]. The MAPE
model describes a control loop with four stages, the Monitor
stage, which determines the environmental conditions that
might drive a change; the Analyze stage, which allows the
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autonomic manager to learn about and predict situations;
the Plan stage, which provides the mechanisms that struc-
ture the action needed to change; and the Execute stage,
which executes the changes. MAPE’s Monitor, Analyze,
and Plan stages correspond to the Plan stage in the PEA cy-
cle, and its Execute stage corresponds to the Evolve stage
in the PEA cycle. The PEA Assess stage does not have an
analogue in the MAPE model, as MAPE serves primarily as
a regulator, although there is scope for assessment during its
Analyze stage.
An evolving critical system should not be activated un-
til the PEA cycle has fully completed, i.e., until the Assess
stage is completed. After an evolution cycle has completed,
it may be desirable to undertake another cycle, e.g., to re-
move software faults that were tolerable during the current
cycle. In any case, the outputs of the Assess stage will likely
be used as inputs to help drive the Plan stage of the next cy-
cle. Continuously evolving autonomic or adaptive systems
can be expected to cycle continuously as a control loop [1]
and so the separation between the Assess and Plan stages
may become blurred.
In order to describe the scope of research required to de-
velop a body of knowledge for ECS we have defined a tax-
onomy of research topics under the PEA+T headings, sum-
marized in Figure 3.
6 Conclusions
Critical computer-based systems are ever more impor-
tant in our lives, but as they age they will be in need of in-
creasing amounts of effort to evolve them to remain useful
[5]. Much work needs to be done to help ease this burden
if the community is not to be overwhelmed (cf. Mens et al.
[8] for a more detailed list of challenges for software evolu-
tion). We propose Evolving Critical Systems as an area for
research to tackle the challenge and outline four scenarios
to highlight some of the important research questions that
should be asked of the community. Given that software evo-
lution can be seen as a compromise between cost and risk,
the most pressing question to ask is which processes, tech-
niques and tools are most cost-effective for evolving critical
systems.
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Figure 3. A Research Taxonomy for Evolving Critical Systems (a more detailed breakdown is given
in [2]).
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